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The fundamental issue of public policy can be simply 
put. There are two questions: Is inflation good or 
bad? And if bad, is some nevertheless justified by 
what is gotten in exchange? 
But so that no one listens on to eventual disap-
pointment, I must say here that I cannot give any-
thing like a definitive answer to the first of the two 
questions, whether inflation is good or bad. For one 
thing, there is nothing like time enough. The litera-
ture on inflation is voluminous. Even if we had two 
weeks, though, instead of fifty minutes, I should be 
in trouble. For some of the arguments about the con-
sequences of inflation, lacking so in detail, pretty 
much defy appraisal. 
You have heard it said, I am sure, that inflation 
inevitably ends in collapse—that excessive unem-
ployment, maybe even social ruin, is the unavoid-
able consequence. And that may very well be. Some 
very eminent economists have made the claim. But 
why is collapse inevitable? So far as I am aware, the 
explanation has never been set out in much if any 
detail, and until it has we must remain, if not 
skeptical, then agnostic. 
In dealing with that first question, all I am going 
to do, then, is consider whether a changing price 
level redistributes wealth and, more particularly, 
whether inflation makes creditors poorer and 
debtors richer. That is, or anyway was, widely be-
lieved. But I am doubtful. Inflation, if deliberate, 
does not help debtors. Nor does it, if deliberate, hurt 
them. But keep in mind that qualifying phrase "if 
deliberate." What I might have said is that infla-
tion, to the extent it is the result of government 
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policy, is largely if not entirely without distributional 
effect. And similarly for deflation. 
Quite a few economists, maybe even a majority, 
still believe that inflation, even if bad, is neverthe-
less justified by what is gotten in exchange: namely, 
fewer unemployed individuals than there otherwise 
would be. But that too, it seems to me, is doubtful. I 
think it quite unlikely that less unemployment can, 
so to speak, be bought by more government-created 
inflation, or that there is a trade-off between unem-
ployment and inflation that can be exploited by 
government. 
"Inflation" Defined 
There may be no need, but let me pause briefly here 
to explain the meaning of the word "inflation," 
which already I have used many times. There is 
some average of the prices of all relevant goods and 
services, what is often referred to as the "price 
level.'' If that average is increasing through time, 
then there is "inflation," and more or less de-
pending on how much the average is increasing 
per unit of time. If the average is decreasing, then 
there is "deflation." And if it is not changing, or is 
constant over time, then there is "price stability." 
So the words "inflation" and "deflation" and 
the phrase "price stability" are all descriptive of the 
behavior of an average of prices, not of any particu-
lar prices. Thus, price stability can obtain when all 
prices are changing, as they will or should be when 
demands and/or supplies are changing. Inflation 
can obtain when some prices are decreasing and de-
flation when some prices are increasing. 
I said that there is some average of relevant 
prices. But what kind of average? And which are the 
relevant prices? Surprisingly perhaps, those are not 
7 easy questions. There is a bulky literature on how to 
measure what we customarily refer to as the "cost of 
living." Our time is too brief, though, for me to at-
tempt an explanation of what the difficulties are, or 
of why even the Consumer Price Index, our official 
cost-of-living index, although faithfully calculated 
each month by our government, is not an entirely 
satisfactory measure. Fortunately, we can get on 
nicely enough without bothering about what the 
ideal measure of the price level is. 
Deliberate inflation does not redistribute wealth 
If political oratory is any guide, it has long been be-
lieved by many that inflation redistributes wealth 
from creditors to debtors—or what has often been 
presumed to be the same thing, from the rich to the 
poor, maybe even from the idle rich to the working 
poor. And it has long been believed that deflation 
redistributes wealth from debtors to creditors—or as 
some would insist, from the poor to the rich. How 
else explain the existence of Populism, supposedly 
the political movement of the debtor class, one of 
the basic tenets of which is that deflation is the in-
vention of the "monied East," a curse, something to 
be avoided like the plague? How else explain the 
Populist belief that monetary policy has never or 
hardly ever been expansionary enough? 
It really is too simple, though, identifying 
creditors as the rich and debtors as the poor, and 
more to the point, saying that price level changes re-
distribute wealth. In a sense, they do. But only in an 
irrelevant sense. A change in the price level that 
was not expected, that has come as a surprise, does 
indeed redistribute wealth. But a change that was 
expected, that was correctly anticipated, does not 
redistribute wealth. For any expected change, of 
whatever magnitude, will be reflected in the agree-
ments reached by borrowers and lenders. Nominal 
interest rates, the rates quoted in their loan con-
tracts, will presumably be set so that in real terms 
borrowers' payments are what they would be with a 
constant price level. 
Suppose that with an expected constant price 
level a nominal interest rate of, say, 5 percent is 
judged reasonable by a particular borrower and a 
particular lender. Then with an expected inflation 
rate of 5 percent, a nominal interest rate of 10 per-
cent must also seem reasonable. For with a 10 
percent rate and an inflation rate of 5 percent, the 
borrower's payments are in real terms exactly what 
they are with a nominal rate of 5 percent and a 
constant price level. And what matter to borrower 
and lender are the real values of those payments— 
not the dollar amounts, but the goods and services 
those payments will buy. 
What if our hypothetical borrower and lender 
have different expectations about inflation? I can 
almost hear you asking. Then they may not reach an 
agreement. Or if they do, it will favor one or the 
other. The point surely is, though, that there is no 
reason whatever to believe that borrowers and 
lenders, as groups, continually differ in their ex-
pectations, and always in the same way, or therefore 
to believe that with inflation (or deflation) there is a 
systematic redistribution of wealth. 
And I can almost hear you saying that nothing 
ever happens as expected, that it is silly to distin-
guish, as I have, between expected and unexpected 
inflation. Or between expected and unexpected de-
flation. Nor can I with any conviction at all dispute 
the charge that economic forecasts, even those of 
the supposed experts, are distressingly inaccurate. 
In the present context, however, it is of no signif-
icance that the economic future is uncertain, that the 
price level has a large random or unpredictable com-
ponent. Ultimately, what interests us is whether 
policy-induced inflation or deflation, inflation or de-
flation deliberately sought by the government, is 
good or bad. What interests us is what the govern-
ment should do, what its price level objective should 
be. And my point is that the desired change of the 
price level, whatever it may be, does not matter, at 
least for the distribution of wealth over debtors and 
creditors. The government may seek an inflation 
rate of, say, 10 percent, or a deflation rate of 5 per-
cent. It may seek price stability. But whatever its 
objective, borrowers and lenders will quickly catch 
on, and just as quickly private credit contracts will 
come to reflect the common expectation. 
It was Lincoln, I believe, who said that the gov-
ernment cannot fool all of the people all of the time. 
(And too bad it is that certain recent presidents were 
not more careful students.) I would make a stronger 
claim, and with some justification supplied by histo-
ry: government cannot even fool a few, except per-
haps fleetingly. That is why, as I believe, deliber-
ately induced inflation does not favor debtors, nor 
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induced, does not decrease the ranks of the un-
employed. 
Keynesians are wrong about the Phillips curve 
Many history books tell us, perhaps even rightly, 
that once upon a time it was the political leaders of 
those engaged in agricultural pursuits, William 
Jennings Bryan and others, who were the advocates 
of inflation. The concern of present-day advocates 
is, though, mostly for workers in industry and 
commerce—or, more accurately, for the marginal 
among those workers, the individuals who have al-
ready become or are most likely to become un-
employed. And present-day advocacy is based on a 
particular belief about what has come to be called 
the Phillips curve, an inverse relationship between 
the inflation rate and the unemployment rate, the 
existence of which, so far as I know, no one doubts. 
That belief—as I shall refer to it, the Keynesian 
belief—is that the Phillips curve changes only 
slightly if at all over time and, moreover, can be ex-
ploited by a willing government. Allegedly, there is 
a choice to be made. By accepting the appropriate 
inflation rate, or by adopting the correct policies, 
those that produce the appropriate inflation rate, the 
government can achieve the desired unemployment 
rate, whatever that may be. More particularly, it can 
achieve full employment, defined as some amount of 
unemployment, 4 percent of the labor force or may-
be 5 or 5V2 percent. It has only to accept or insist up-
on whatever inflation rate is implied by the Phillips 
curve. 
I am not entirely sure in my own mind what the 
original theoretical justification for the Keynesian 
belief (or interpretation of the Phillips curve) was. 
Chances are, though, that it was something as fol-
lows. The unemployment rate measures how the 
demand for labor compares with the supply of labor. 
The lower that rate is, the greater is demand relative 
to supply. But the greater is demand as it compares 
with supply, the fiercer is the competition for work-
ers, that is, the greater is the upward pressure on 
wages. And clearly, barring some freakish develop-
ment, such as the emergence of an effective OPEC, 
prices must change at about the same rate as wages. 
Competition among producers keeps prices from in-
creasing at a higher rate. Nor can they increase at a 
lower rate for very long; the threat of bankruptcy 
guarantees that. 
So we have an explanation for the Keynesian be-
lief about or interpretation of the inverse relation-
ship between the unemployment rate and the infla-
tion rate. But it is not at all satisfactory. For as Pro-
fessor Milton Friedman has pointed out, the demand 
for labor depends not on the number of dollars per 
hour that workers must be paid, but on how that 
number compares with another, the number of dol-
lars that a unit of the output produced by workers 
can be sold for. It depends on how profitable hiring 
workers is, and that profitability is measured not by 
one number, but by a ratio. In the language of econ-
omists, the demand for labor depends not on the 
money wage, but on the real wage, the ratio of the 
money wage to the product price. 
The supply of labor also depends on the real 
wage. The concern of workers is not for the number 
of dollars received for an hour of work. Rather, it is 
for the amount of goods and services that can be 
bought with an hour of work, which is given by the 
ratio of the money wage to the (average of the) 
prices of goods and services. 
Inflation expectations affect wage agreements 
If it is right, though, that labor demand and labor 
supply depend upon or are determined by the real 
wage, and surely that must be so, then it is also 
right that the basic inverse relationship is between 
the unemployment rate and the rate of change of 
real wages. The unemployment rate measures how 
the demand for labor compares with the supply, or 
how fierce the competition for labor is; and what re-
sponds is the real wage. It is the real wage, not the 
money wage, that increases a little or a lot, depend-
ing on how fierce the competition is. 
With that conclusion, we have come almost to 
Professor Friedman's belief about the Phillips curve. 
All that remains is to acknowledge two facts, one 
mathematical and the other (perhaps more appear-
ance than reality) institutional. The mathematical 
fact is that the rate of change of the real wage, in 
percent, is the difference between the rate of change 
of the money wage and the rate of change of the 
price level. And the institutional fact is that money 
wages are set only periodically, not every day or 
even every month. 
The significance of that institutional fact (if fact 
it be) is that the expected inflation rate is therefore 
9 relevant. Workers and employers care about real 
wages. In deciding how much money wages are to 
increase, it is therefore relevant how much the price 
level is going to increase. Or since wages are set 
only periodically, what is relevant is how much the 
level will increase between now and when wages are 
set again. But that is not known. So workers and 
employers must rely on their expectations which in 
general are the same. There is, then, an expected 
inflation rate that helps determine the rate of in-
crease of money wages and thereby the rate of in-
crease of the price level—or in other words, the 
actual inflation rate. 
According to the Keynesian interpretation of the 
Phillips curve, the unemployment rate is determined 
by the inflation rate—or to be more precise, by the 
actual (as opposed to the expected) inflation rate. 
Given the actual inflation rate, as determined by 
government policy, the unemployment rate is 
known. 
But as Professor Friedman has convincingly 
argued, the Keynesian interpretation derives from a 
misspecification of labor demand and supply. And 
as we have now seen, a correct specification yields a 
more complicated interpretation of the Phillips 
curve, the classical or Friedmanian interpretation, 
according to which the unemployment rate is deter-
mined not only by the actual inflation rate but by the 
expected inflation rate as well. Given the actual in-
flation rate, the unemployment rate will be high or 
low depending on what the expected inflation rate 
is. If inflation is expected to proceed at a low rate, 
then the unemployment rate will be low. But if infla-
tion is expected to be considerable, then the unem-
ployment rate will be high. 
How expectations are formed 
affects what government can do 
What interests us, of course, are the implications for 
stabilization policy of the classical belief about the 
Phillips curve. What difference does it make that the 
expected inflation rate also appears in that relation-
ship, along with the unemployment rate and the 
actual inflation rate? That would seem to depend on 
how the expected inflation rate is determined and, 
more particularly, on how the expected and actual 
inflation rates are related. 
Professor Friedman evidently believes, as do 
many other economists, that the expected inflation 
rate is an average of past inflation rates, with the 
most recent of those being weighted more heavily 
than those of the more distant past. And on that as-
sumption, sometimes referred to as the adaptive ex-
pectations hypothesis, what the classical interpreta-
tion of the Phillips curve tells us, among other 
things, is that to stand still the government must run 
faster and faster. To maintain a given unemploy-
ment rate, that corresponding, say, to full employ-
ment, the government must year after year increase 
the actual inflation rate. The actual inflation rate 
must accelerate. Which is why Professor Friedman's 
view has come to be known as the "accelerationist 
doctrine." 
Let me illustrate with more hypothetical num-
bers. Suppose that the government wants an unem-
ployment rate of 5 percent and that initially the pub-
lic is expecting an inflation rate of 2 percent. (It may 
be that the actual inflation rate has been 2 percent 
for quite some time.) And suppose further that ac-
cording to the real-world Phillips curve, classical in 
nature, the government is therefore required in the 
current period to impose an actual inflation rate of 4 
percent. But then in the next period the expected in-
flation rate is not 2 percent. It must be higher, may-
be 3 percent. For if the expected rate is an average 
of past actual rates, replacing a 2 percent rate with a 
4 percent rate increases the average. With the public 
having increased its expected inflation rate, though, 
the government, still wanting a 5 percent unemploy-
ment rate, must impose an actual inflation rate 
higher than 4 percent, let us say 5 percent. So the 
expected inflation rate increases again; and in con-
sequence the actual inflation rate does too. And on 
and on the process goes. 
And the implication of accelerating inflation does 
not appear to be contradicted by postwar experience. 
The average actual inflation rate for the period 1970-
1976 is higher than that for the 1960s. And the aver-
age unemployment rate of 1970-1976 is also higher 
than that of the 1960s. 
Professor Friedman seems to have carried the 
day. Dr. Arthur Okun, former chair of the Council of 
Economic Advisers and continuing protagonist of 
Professor Friedman, wrote not too long ago (I have 
forgotten exactly where) that we are all acceleration-
ists now. Most economists have come to see that the 
expected inflation rate matters and evidently to 
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has suggested. 
The near-unanimity that we appear to have 
achieved is not, however, all that significant. How 
quickly the expected inflation rate gets revised is 
still at issue. And if slowly enough, then it is as if the 
Keynesian belief about the Phillips curve were the 
relevant one. That is, if the expected inflation rate 
gets revised only very slowly, then in effect it does 
not appear in the Phillips curve relationship. So it is 
not that the majority of those trained when Keynes-
ianism was still dominant have given up the belief 
that more government-induced inflation buys less 
unemployment. It maybe does so only in the short 
run. But as those who still believe would insist, that 
short run is a very long stretch of calendar time—for 
sure, years and years, and maybe a decade or two. 
The Rational Expectations Hypothesis 
There is another way of phrasing Professor Fried-
man's view. Maintaining almost any constant un-
employment rate, or maintaining full employment 
as conventionally defined, necessarily involves con-
tinuously fooling the public, or continuously pro-
ducing an inflation rate different from that which 
was expected. And some, economists and others, 
have expressed doubt about the morality of the gov-
ernment ever purposely confounding its citizenry. 
Another question, though, is whether it can. 
To put the question another way: how reasonable 
is the Friedman expectations assumption, the adap-
tive expectations hypothesis, which to repeat says 
that the expected inflation rate is an average of past 
actual rates? I find it very difficult to accept, partly 
because it portrays individuals as being so dumb, so 
unmindful of their own interests. According to the 
hypothesis, they learn from the past, or rather, a tiny 
portion thereof, but in such a way that they can go 
on forever being fooled. The government has only to 
make the current-period inflation rate greater than 
that of the period just past. And individuals will 
never catch on. 
But I do not believe that. Whatever the govern-
ment does, individuals will catch on, and if not im-
mediately, then quickly. What should be assumed is 
not that individuals simply average past infla-
tion rates, but that they look to what government 
policy is, to what the objectives of policy are. What 
should be assumed is that in making forecasts, they 
use the best available approximation of policy, 
thereby doing as well for themselves as they can. 
That is what the rational expectations hypothesis 
says: individuals, anxious to do as well as they can, 
make the best possible forecasts. And it is an impli-
cation that the government cannot influence the un-
employment rate, except maybe over a very short 
short run. If constrained by a classical Phillips 
curve, the government can reduce the unemploy-
ment rate by increasing the actual inflation rate, but 
only if the expected inflation rate does not change by 
the same amount. If it does, then despite the in-
crease in the actual inflation rate, the unemploy-
ment rate remains what it was. And if individuals 
form their expectations by looking at what govern-
ment policy is, then they know, approximately 
anyway, what the actual inflation rate will be. The 
actual and expected inflation rates are always 
roughly the same. (They differ only to the extent 
that the actual rate is influenced by unpredictable 
events.) 
Under the rational expectations hypothesis, in-
dividuals are, if ever, only briefly wrong about the 
intent of government. And as I said a few moments 
ago, the classical interpretation of the Phillips curve 
implies that government can manipulate the un-
employment rate only to the extent that it can fool 
individuals. 
It may be a bit hard for you to swallow, my con-
tention that the public is always pretty much aware 
of what the government's stabilization policy is— 
what its objectives are and what it will be doing to 
achieve those objectives. Each of us has at least one 
rather dim relative, an uncle perhaps, maybe even 
an aunt, who does not have the faintest notion what 
the phrase "stabilization policy" means, let alone 
know what the actual policy of the moment is. It is, 
however, not required that everyone know, only 
some, those who are strategically located. For 
example, where trade unions represent workers, it 
is enough that the leadership know. And it would 
seem right that the typical present-day union leader-
ship is pretty well informed. 
Or perhaps I am being too literal. If I may para-
phrase Professor Robert Lucas (in the Journal of 
Economic Literature, September 1975, pp. 889-90): 
Everyone knows that there are many, many in-
dividuals who do not possess the knowledge to 
11 make
 4 'good" forecasts. (How many are there who 
have never even heard of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem?) But consider what follows from the adaptive 
expectations hypothesis or any other arbitrary fore-
casting rule-of-thumb. Unusual profit opportunities 
can persist forever. For one individual's bad (bi-
ased) forecast is another's opportunity for unusu-
al profit. Most economists do not, however, believe 
that such opportunities go begging for long. So in a 
sense the rational expectations hypothesis must be 
accepted. 
I should also point out that the rational expecta-
tions hypothesis, an essential underpinning of the 
conclusion that the government is pretty much 
unable to influence the unemployment rate, is not 
contradicted by the undeniable fact that even the 
experts are very often wrong about what is going to 
happen to the price level. As I said earlier, there are 
certain influences, such as weather, that are very 
difficult to predict. That is why so many poor fore-
casts are made. For the government to be without 
influence, however, it is not necessary that forecasts 
be perfect, but only that the public not be systemat-
ically wrong about what inflation rate the govern-
ment is intent on achieving. 
Even if the rational expectations hypothesis is 
wrong, the government's ability to influence the un-
employment rate may be slight and getting slighter. 
You are aware, I am sure, that today many wage 
agreements, formal and informal, provide for auto-
matic adjustment of wages to changes in the 
price level. Escalator clauses have become common, 
and in all likelihood, unless by some miracle price 
stability is restored, will become more so in future. 
But think what the existence of an escalator clause 
implies: in effect, that expectations are perfectly ac-
curate, that the portion of the public covered by the 
clause cannot ever be fooled. 
We perhaps are still a long way from having de-
termined empirically how price-level expectations 
are formed. There is some evidence that the rational 
expectations hypothesis is better than its rival, the 
adaptive expectations hypothesis. But that evidence 
is fragmentary, and I must again confess that I favor 
it partly because the alternative portrays people as 
being so dumb. 
Let me add, though, that it is of great signifi-
cance if in fact we are quite in the dark about how 
expectations are formed. If a government does not 
know, then neither does it know the effect on the 
unemployment rate of any particular policy. It does 
not know how or to what extent individuals will be 
fooled. To insist, rightly perhaps, that we are far 
from knowing about expectations is to maintain that 
the expected inflation rate is pretty much random— 
or, since there is no possibility of systematically 
fooling individuals, that the unemployment rate is 
beyond the reach of government. 
Government can influence the inflation rate 
I have all along been assuming that government can 
impose whatever inflation rate it wants on the econ-
omy, and before stopping I want to say a little about 
that assumption. 
For one thing, it is wrong. As I pointed out 
above, there are forces that influence the price level 
that are either in whole or in part unpredictable. Pri-
vate forecasters cannot predict them perfectly. 
Neither can government. And in consequence it 
cannot make the price level or the inflation rate 
whatever it wants it to be. To offset the influence of 
weather, it must know in advance what the weather 
is going to be. But it never does, not exactly, any-
way. 
Government can, however, influence the price 
level or inflation rate, particularly over a longish 
period of time. And that, being all that is required 
for my analysis, is what I should have assumed. But 
I did not want in the beginning to complicate the 
analysis unduly. 
Doubtless, you know a good deal about how gov-
ernments (writ large, to include central banks) in-
fluence inflation rates, maybe more than you ever 
cared to. I am going to carry on for a bit longer, 
though, talking about the influence of the Federal 
Reserve. 
There was a time—not all that long ago actually, 
perhaps even as recently as 10 or 15 years ago— 
when there were many who were extremely skeptical 
about the potency of monetary policy. It was largely 
if not entirely ignored. Fiscal policy got the atten-
tion. Now, though, economists are pretty much 
agreed that monetary policy is an important (possi-
bly the most important) determinant of the price 
level and the rate of change thereof. 
But some economists, and some public officials 
as well, insist on a curious asymmetry. They say, as 
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can deal with "demand-pull" inflation but not with 
"cost-push" inflation. Allegedly, it makes a differ-
ence whether the price level is increasing because 
aggregate demand is excessive, greater than supply, 
or because costs of production are increasing. 
Taken literally the claim is silly. What if costs are 
increasing because aggregate demand is (or was) 
excessive? Money wages may be increasing faster 
than labor productivity because, with aggregate de-
mand excessive, the price level is increasing. Infla-
tion is a process which feeds on itself. And to say 
that the Federal Reserve cannot deal with cost-push 
inflation (of which there typically is some when, with 
excess demand, the price level is increasing) is to 
say that it cannot deal with inflation. 
What those who insist on the curious asymmetry 
may have in mind, though, are "autonomous" cost 
increases, an example of which is presumably that 
caused by OPEC in late 1973. And such an increase 
may induce what looks like inflation. For a while the 
price level may go on increasing. The initial in-
crease, caused by an autonomous increase in costs, 
may result in an increase in money wages that 
exceeds the increase in productivity and thereby in a 
further price increase. 
But the Federal Reserve can offset even an au-
tonomous cost increase. It has only to be resolute, to 
refuse to accommodate the cost and resulting price 
increases by increasing the money supply. Of 
course, if it refuses, unemployment may increase; 
it may increase considerably. And the potential un-
employment increase is no doubt what looms large 
in the minds of those who espouse the asymmetry 
proposition. Supposedly, dealing with demand-pull 
inflation does not increase unemployment, whereas 
dealing with cost-push inflation does. 
Yet that cannot be right. Even the Keynesian in-
terpretation of the Phillips curve implies that the un-
employment rate increases with a decrease in the 
actual inflation rate. So is it that dealing with de-
mand-pull inflation always involves less of an in-
crease in unemployment than does dealing with 
cost-push inflation? Possibly, but that is not to say 
that the Federal Reserve, when confronted with an 
autonomous cost increase, is helpless. Moreover, it 
could well be, as I have argued, that the unemploy-
ment rate will be pretty much the same whatever the 
Federal Reserve does, whether it does or does not 
accommodate the cost increase. 
Summary 
I have now, though, run on long enough. It is time to 
sum up. Fortunately, that is quickly done. As I have 
suggested, the nineteenth-century rationale for in-
flation, that it would ease the burden of (poor) debt-
ors, would appear to be sophistry. So would the ra-
tionale of the past couple of decades, that more in-
flation buys less unemployment, and that therefore, 
although inflation may be bad, some must be ac-
cepted. 
Obviously, to say that the case for inflation has 
not yet been made is not to say that there is none, or 
that price stability is therefore the proper objective 
of the government. It may be, but at this moment we 
do not know. One day we may. We have in the past 
fifty years been through two revolutions in econom-
ics, the Keynesian revolution and more recently the 
monetarist or classical counter-revolution. But an-
other is just beginning, a revolution against tradi-
tional macroeconomics, both Keynesian and classi-
cal, or against the macroeconomic approach to eco-
nomics. We are going back to the microeconomic ap-
proach, and that approach may at some not-too-
distant point in time give us an answer to the ques-
tion of what is the optimal behavior of the price level. 
And now for one final comment. I doubt I have 
any cause for concern. Even so, I am going to end by 
saying that I hope I have not convinced you of any-
thing. My purpose was never that, but only to give 
you a little something to think about. 
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